Combinatorial Auctions For Procurement
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Combinatorial Auctions For Procurement
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Author : Marcelo Olivares
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2011
Combinatorial Auctions For Procurement written by Marcelo Olivares and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2011 with categories.
In this paper we conduct an empirical investigation of a large-scale combinatorial auction (CA); the Chilean auction for school meals in which the government procures half a billion dollars worth of meal services every year. Our empirical study is motivated by two fundamental aspects in the design of CAs: (1) which packages should bidders be allowed to bid on; and (2) diversifying the supplier base to promote competition. We use bidding data to uncover important aspects of the firms' cost structure and their strategic behavior, both of which are not directly observed by the auctioneer; these estimates inform the auction design. Our results indicate that package bidding that allows firms to express their cost synergies due to economies of scale and density seems appropriate. However, we also found evidence that firms can take advantage of this flexibility by discounting package bids for strategic reasons and not driven by cost synergies. Because this behavior can lead to inefficiencies, it may be worth evaluating whether to prohibit certain specific combinations in the bidding process. Our results also suggest that market share restrictions and running sequential auctions seem to promote competition in the long-run, without significantly increasing the short-run cost for the government due to unrealized cost synergies. Our results highlight that the simultaneous consideration of the firms' operational cost structure and their strategic behavior is key to the successful design of a CA. More broadly, our paper is the first to provide an econometric study of a large-scale CA, providing novel and substantive insights regarding bidding behavior in this type of auctions.
Transportation Service Procurement Using Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : XiaoPing Chen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Transportation Service Procurement Using Combinatorial Auctions written by XiaoPing Chen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
Auction is a mechanism of selling distinct assets that can be both physical objects and virtual objects. Examples of virtual objects are the rights to use assets like airport time slots and FCC spectrum, or to service truckload delivery routes in a transportation network. Under some situations bidding on combinations of objects can render lower total price compare with bidding the objects one at a time, and the auction that allows bidders to bid on combinations of different assets are called combinatorial auctions. With shipper being the auctioneer and carriers being the bidders, combinatorial auction has become increasingly important in the transportation service procurement domain, due to its mechanism to align shipper s procurement interest with carrier transportation service cost structure, which in turn lowers shippers total procurement cost. The thesis provides a comprehensive review of the use of conditional bidding within a transportation combinatorial auction framework. The thesis first describes the general forms of the transportation services available, and discusses the economics of motor carriers that provide LTL and TL services. It then illustrates the basic optimization technique of conditional bidding for TL service procurement and discusses the information technologies that enable the optimization-based procurement and the actual application of the method in the real world.
The Practice Of Supply Chain Management Where Theory And Application Converge
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Author : Terry P. Harrison
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2005-01-04
The Practice Of Supply Chain Management Where Theory And Application Converge written by Terry P. Harrison and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-01-04 with Business & Economics categories.
For over a decade, there has been an increasing interest in the use of supply chain methods to improve performance across the entire business enterprise. This text provides an overview of this important practice-research cycle.
Bidder Response To Combinatorial Auctions In Truckload Procurement
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Author : Plummer Clinton Lee
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003
Bidder Response To Combinatorial Auctions In Truckload Procurement written by Plummer Clinton Lee and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.
This thesis explores how truckload carriers use conditional bids within the framework of a combinatorial auction to win more business and balance their existing networks. Because a considerable portion of a truckload carrier's cost of serving a given lane is associated with the probability of finding a follow-on load (i.e. economies of scope), bidding on a lane-by-lane basis may not accurately reflect a carrier's true cost of serving that lane. In a combinatorial auction, a truckload carrier can more accurately reflect its true cost of serving a given lane by offering package discounts, conditional on winning lanes that increase the probability of finding follow-on loads. Though a considerable amount has been written about the economics of truckload carrier's operations and the benefits of combinatorial auctions to shippers, few have studied conditional bidding from a bidder's (carrier's) perspective. This thesis makes three contributions. First, an explanation of why bidders do and don't submit conditional bids in combinatorial auctions is provided. Second, a model of carrier costs functions, including package discounts (a measure of economies of scope) is developed. Finally, this thesis examines regional pricing differences, and quantifies the amount by which carriers will change their prices in different regions of the US.
Agent Based Combinatorial Auctions In Supply Chains
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Author : Omar Abbaas
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2022
Agent Based Combinatorial Auctions In Supply Chains written by Omar Abbaas and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2022 with categories.
This research explores the decentralization of supply chain management using agent-based techniques to solve traditionally difficult optimization problems. These problems are decomposed into smaller and easier-to-solve subproblems on the agents' level. An agent here can represent a resource, supplier, buyer, etc. Auction mechanisms are used for communication and coordination between the different agents. There are three objectives for this research: (1) study and expand the literature on agent-based models with auction mechanisms in decentralized supply chains, (2) explore application areas for this approach in modern supply chains, and (3) propose models and algorithms for a selected sample of application areas, then implement the proposed methodologies and evaluate their performance. In Chapter 3, we provide an application of this approach in the joint order acceptance and job shop scheduling problem. A set of available jobs is provided. Each job has a profit, ready time, due date, and deadline, and consists of a set of operations that have precedence relationships. An operation has a processing time and may require multiple units of capacity per time unit to be completed. Jobs that deviate from their due dates incur earliness and tardiness penalties, resources could have more than one unit of capacity, and the facility layout can be of any type. The manufacturer has the option to reject any of the offered jobs in order to maximize the overall profit while satisfying the capacity constraints. We present a mathematical model for the problem, then use Lagrangian relaxation and combinatorial auctions to solve it. First, the problem is decomposed into a set of job-level scheduling subproblems. Each job is optimized individually without considering capacity constraints. Profitable jobs at the individual level submit their bids to an auctioneer in order to acquire combinations of resource capacity-time units. Then, the auctioneer records the profit upper bound, resolves capacity conflicts to reach a feasible solution using our provided feasibility restoration algorithm, records the profit lower bound, and updates the Lagrangian multipliers. Experimental results show that the proposed methodology is capable of solving large-sized problems with competitive outcomes. In Chapter 4, we address the multi-item multi-sourcing supplier selection and order allocation problem. Suppliers use an efficient procurement combinatorial auction format to submit bids to a single manufacturer. Each bid carries information about the supplier's cost structure and potential discounts. Instead of using the traditional and computationally expensive static bidding language or the existing restrictive flexible bidding language, we propose a new flexible procurement combinatorial auction bidding language and then prove that it allows for more efficient auction outcomes. A Mixed Integer Non-Linear Programming (MINLP) model is developed for the problem under the proposed bidding language considering purchasing, transportation, ordering, administrative, and holding costs. The manufacturer makes a set of finished products that experience price-sensitive demand rates and sells them to end consumers. We use the logit function to represent the finished products' price-sensitive demand rates. These considerations make the results of this study realistic with the potential to be used in practical applications. Also, we derive a set of necessary optimality conditions that must exist in at least one optimal solution. At the end of the chapter, several numerical examples are solved to illustrate the bidding language and the derived theorems. Chapter 5 proposes an iterative auction mechanism for the multi-item multi-sourcing supplier selection and order allocation problem. Suppliers use the efficient flexible bidding language proposed in Chapter 4 to submit bids to a single manufacturer. In these bids, suppliers offer two types of discounts: synergy discount for bundles of related items, and all-unit quantity discount. We design an iterative procurement combinatorial auction mechanism that aims to maximize the manufacturer's profit by revealing the suppliers' minimum acceptable selling prices. The mechanism starts with initial bids submitted by the suppliers. The manufacturer stores all the submitted bids throughout the auction in a database and makes them accessible to the participating suppliers. The manufacturer solves an MINLP model to determine the winning suppliers and allocate orders for the current iteration. Then the manufacturer shares the solution with the suppliers and gives them the opportunity to adjust their bids for future iterations. However, to guarantee progress toward the suppliers' minimum acceptable prices, the manufacturer asks any supplier planning to submit an updated bid to adjust the selling prices and allow the manufacturer's profit to increase by a certain profit improvement factor. We develop a new MINLP model that helps the suppliers to maximize their profits while satisfying the manufacturer's profit improvement constraint. If a supplier cannot find a feasible solution that will improve the manufacturer's profit while earning the desired minimum profit markup, this supplier does not submit new updated bids. If there are no new updated bids submitted, the manufacturer reduces the profit improvement factor. The mechanism continues until no new updated bids are submitted and the profit improvement factor reaches a pre-determined minimum threshold. Finally, numerical examples are solved to illustrate the auction mechanism.
High Performance Computing And Grids In Action
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Author : Lucio Grandinetti
language : en
Publisher: IOS Press
Release Date : 2008
High Performance Computing And Grids In Action written by Lucio Grandinetti and has been published by IOS Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2008 with Computers categories.
Collects in four chapters single monographs related to the fundamental advances in parallel computer systems and their developments from different points of view (from computer scientists, computer manufacturers, end users) and related to the establishment and evolution of grids fundamentals, implementation and deployment.
Combinatorial Auctions
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Author : Peter C. Cramton
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
Release Date : 2006
Combinatorial Auctions written by Peter C. Cramton and has been published by MIT Press (MA) this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Business & Economics categories.
A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.
Logistics Engineering Handbook
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Author : G. Don Taylor
language : en
Publisher: CRC Press
Release Date : 2007-12-14
Logistics Engineering Handbook written by G. Don Taylor and has been published by CRC Press this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2007-12-14 with Business & Economics categories.
Achieving state-of-the-art excellence and attaining the cost reductions associated with outstanding logistics efforts is an obvious gain in terms of competitive edge and profitability. As logistics tools evolve in comprehensiveness and complexity, and the use of these new tools becomes more pervasive, maintaining a position of leadership in logisti
Computational Science Iccs 2005
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Author : V.S. Sunderam
language : en
Publisher: Springer Science & Business Media
Release Date : 2005-05-12
Computational Science Iccs 2005 written by V.S. Sunderam and has been published by Springer Science & Business Media this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005-05-12 with Computers categories.
Annotation The three-volume set LNCS 3514-3516 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Computational Science, ICCS 2005, held in Atlanta, GA, USA in May 2005. The 464 papers presented were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 834 submissions for the main conference and its 21 topical workshops. The papers span the whole range of computational science, ranging from numerical methods, algorithms, and computational kernels to programming environments, grids, networking, and tools. These fundamental contributions dealing with computer science methodologies and techniques are complemented by papers discussing computational applications and needs in virtually all scientific disciplines applying advanced computational methods and tools to achieve new discoveries with greater accuracy and speed.
Bids And Costs In Combinatorial And Noncombinatorial Procurement Auctions Evidence From Procurement Of Public Cleaning Contracts
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Author : Anders Lunander
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2013
Bids And Costs In Combinatorial And Noncombinatorial Procurement Auctions Evidence From Procurement Of Public Cleaning Contracts written by Anders Lunander and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2013 with categories.
Combinatorial procurement auctions enable suppliers to pass their potential cost synergies on to the procuring entity and may therefore lead to lower costs and enhance efficiency. However, bidders might find it profitable to inflate their stand-alone bids in order to favor their package bids. Using data from standard and combinatorial procurement auctions, we find that bids on individual contracts in simultaneous standard auctions without the option to submit package bids are significantly lower than the corresponding stand-alone bids in combinatorial auctions. Further, no significant difference in procurer's cost as explained by auction format is found.