Combinatorial Auctions

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Combinatorial Auctions

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Author : Peter C. Cramton
language : en
Publisher: MIT Press (MA)
Release Date : 2006

Combinatorial Auctions written by Peter C. Cramton and has been published by MIT Press (MA) this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2006 with Business & Economics categories.

A synthesis of theoretical and practical research on combinatorial auctions from the perspectives of economics, operations research, and computer science.

A Study In Combinatorial Auctions

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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

A Study In Combinatorial Auctions written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.

By the emergence of electronic commerce and low transaction costs on the Internet, an interest in the design of new auction mechanisms has been arisen. Recently many researchers in computer science, economics, business, and game theory have presented many valuable studies on the subject of online auctions, and auctions theory. When faced from a computational perspective, combinatorial auctions are perhaps the most challenging ones. Combinatorial auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-item multi-unit situations where the agents’ valuations of the items are not additive. However, determining the winners to maximize the revenue is NP-complete. In this study, we first analyze the existing approaches for combinatorial auction problem. Based on this analysis, we then choose three different approaches, which are search approach, descending simultaneous auctions approach, and IP (Integer Programming) formulation approach to build our models. The performances of the models are compared using computer simulations, where we model bandwidth allocation system. Finally a combinatorial auction tool is built which can be used for online auctions and e-procurement systems.

Combinatorial Auctions

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Author : Christopher Wu
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Combinatorial Auctions written by Christopher Wu and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Auctions categories.

Winner Determination In Combinatorial Auctions

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Author : Thomas Elendner
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Winner Determination In Combinatorial Auctions written by Thomas Elendner and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with categories.

Eine kombinatorische Auktion zeichnet sich dadurch aus, dassmehrere Objekte simultan versteigert werden und die Bieter Geboteauf Teilmengen von Objekten abgeben k onnen. Gibt es keinerleiBeschr ankungen bei der Gebotsabgabe, so gestaltet sich dieoptimale Zuordnung von Objekten zu Bietern (Gewinnerbestimmung) imAllgemeinen als NP--schwer. Dieses Buch besch aftigt sich vorrangig mit derGewinnerbestimmung; es werden Optimierungs -modelle zuspezifischen kombinatorischen Auktionen aufgestellt und f urausgew ahlte Modelle Algorithmen entwickelt und getestet. Im Zentrum der Arbeit wird untersucht, wie eine fiktiveUnternehmensleitung (Auktionator) mit Hilfe einer kombinatorischenAuktion Zeitfenster (Objekte) einer kapazit atsbeschr anktenProduktionsanlage auf Profit--Center (Bieter) verteilen kann. AlsOptimierungsmodell wird das Weighted Job Interval SchedulingProblem identifiziert; die daf ur entwickelte Lagrangeheuristikliefert in Rechenstudien im Mittel bessere untere Schrankenals eine aus der Literatur ausgew ahlte Heuristik. In einer Verallgemeinerung werden knappe Budgets von Seiten derProfit--Center angenommen. In Rechenstudien zeigt sich, dass eineentwickelte Lagrange--Dekompostion bessere obere Schranken als diedurch CPLEX berechnete LP--L osung liefert und die Heuristik imMittel gute untere Schranken findet. Des weiteren wird die Anwendung von kombinatorischen Auktionen inder Praxis analysiert; in einem Fall wird gezeigt, dass knappeRessourcen in einem grossen deutschen Versicherungsunternehmeneffizienter mit einer kombinatorischen Auktion als mit einem vondem Unternehmen vorgeschlagenen Verfahren verteilt werdenk onnen. Des weiteren wird ein Pilotprojekt von DaimlerChryslervorgestellt; hier wurde eine kombinatorische Ausschreibung zurBeschaffung von Transportkapazit at erfolgreich angewendet. [.5cm]In a combinatorial auction many items are put up for auctionsimultaneously and the bidders are allowed to place bids onsubsets of items. If no restrictions on placing bids do exist, theassignment of items to bidders (winner determination)is proven to be NP-hard in the general case. This book focuses on deriving mathematical models and algorithmsfor the winner determination problem. Mainly, we show how scarcetime slots (items) on a machine which is made available by theheadquarters (auctioneer) can be assigned to profit--centers(bidders) using a combinatorial auction. The Weighted Job IntervalScheduling Problem serves as winner determination problem; runtimestudies show that a Lagrangean heuristic outperforms a heuristictaken from the literature. Furthermore, we analyze the situation where the profit--centersare assumed to be budget--restricted. To solve the winnerdetermination problem a Lagrangean decomposition is used; runtimestudies show that our upper bounds outperform the LP--solutioncalculated by CPLEX and the proposed lower bounds seem to be tight. Afterwards, the application of combinatorial auctions in practiceis studied. We state an allocation problem at a large Germaninsurance company; it is shown, that combinatorial auctions canderive more efficient allocations than an algorithm proposed bythe company. Finally, we provide the experiences of the first useof a combinatorial reverse auction at DaimlerChrysler wheretransportation capacity was successfully procured.

Risk Management For Combinatorial Auctions

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Author : Alan Holland
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2005

Risk Management For Combinatorial Auctions written by Alan Holland and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2005 with Auctions categories.

Auction theory has traditionally regarded bids in auctions as enforceable commitments. We relax this important, yet often incorrect, assumption that is common to almost all prior literature on the subject. This work addresses the possibility of winning bids being withdrawn, or reneged upon, before a transaction is completed successfully. In particular, we examine the significance of winning-bid withdrawal in a combinatorial auction setting. We find that it may be difficult or even impossible for the bid-taker to find a repair solution of adequate revenue without causing undue disturbance to the remaining winning bids in the allocation. We have called this the bid-taker{u2019}s exposure problem and we also show that it is exacerbated for a risk averse bid-taker. It is preferable for the bid-taker to pre-empt uncertainty by choosing a solution that is robust to bid-withdrawal and provides a guarantee that possible with-drawls may be repaired easily with a bounded loss in revenue. We discuss the computational difficulties posed by risk management and investigate a constraint programming approach to tackling the problem. We also analyze the drawbacks of this approach and motivate useful extensions to the framework. We then propose a new framework that facilitates solution robustness for constraint programs in a wide range of settings. We briefly demonstrate its versatility with an application to job-shop scheduling. We then apply this new framework to combinatorial auctions in order to investigate the trade-off between robustness and revenue. We also introduce a new auction model that improves solution reparability by facilitating backtracking on winning bids by the bid-taker. We demonstrate experimentally that fewer winning bids partake in robust solutions, thereby reducing any associated overhead in dealing with extra bidders. Finally, we consider the case in which the bid-taker wishes to optimize some social objective, thereby necessitating truthful bidding. We have provided some impossibility results pertaining to truthful mechanism design that incorporate robust solutions. However, we also propose a means of circumventing this problem for restricted class of combinatorial auctions. We develop an approximate allocation algorithm that incentivizes truthful bidding whilst attaining an allocation that minimizes the risk of revenue loss in the event of a winning bid being withdrawn.

Design Issues For Combinatorial Auctions

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Author : Crainic, Teodor
language : en
Publisher: Montréal : Centre for Research on Transportation = Centre de recherche sur les transports (C.R.T.)
Release Date : 2002

Design Issues For Combinatorial Auctions written by Crainic, Teodor and has been published by Montréal : Centre for Research on Transportation = Centre de recherche sur les transports (C.R.T.) this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2002 with categories.

How To Bid Effectively In Multi Unit Multi Item Combinatorial Auctions

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Author : Anup K. Sen
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2018

How To Bid Effectively In Multi Unit Multi Item Combinatorial Auctions written by Anup K. Sen and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2018 with categories.

When a bid is placed on a package in a combinatorial auction (CA), the bid value must be large enough to ensure that the package remains in contention for inclusion in winning combinations in future. The Deadness Level (DL) of a package can serve as an ask price on a fresh bid that can be meaningfully placed on it. Package DL values in single-unit CAs are readily determined. In recent years, however, interest in multi-unit CAs has grown rapidly. The number of packages can be very large in this case, and bidders need greater guidance in estimating valuations. But the DL value of a package tends to creep upwards unsteadily as more bids are placed, and no closed form expression or computational method has been found for it as yet. Here we present for the first time an exact method for determining package DLs in the multi-unit case, assuming that an OR bidding language is being used. A dynamic programming implementation is described that enables fast incremental computations of ask prices after each bid. Experimental runs on simulated data and live data from a recent U.K. multi-unit spectrum auction show that the memory requirement is not excessive. Thus the proposed method could help to promote bidder participation in online multi-unit eBay-like CAs in the procurement and sale of commodities.

Management Science

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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 1998-05

Management Science written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 1998-05 with Industrial management categories.

Issues for Feb. 1965-Aug. 1967 include Bulletin of the Institute of Management Sciences.

Micai

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Author :
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2004

Micai written by and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2004 with Artificial intelligence categories.

Double Sided Combinatorial Auctions With Attributes Theory And Algorithms

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Author : Henri O. Schellhorn
language : en
Publisher:
Release Date : 2003

Double Sided Combinatorial Auctions With Attributes Theory And Algorithms written by Henri O. Schellhorn and has been published by this book supported file pdf, txt, epub, kindle and other format this book has been release on 2003 with categories.

Combinatorial auctions have existed for a long time in securities markets. In these auctions buyers and sellers can place orders on combinations, or bundles of different securities. These orders are conjunctive: they are matched only if the full bundle is available. On business-to-business exchanges, buyers have the choice to receive the same product with different attributes; for instance the same product can be produced by different sellers. A buyer indicates his preference by submitting a disjunctive order, where he specifies how much of the product he wants, and how much he values each attribute. Only the item(s) with the best attributes and price will be matched. This article considers an auction that trades both types of orders, conjunctive and disjunctive, which we call a combinatorial auction with attributes. We prove the existence of a quot;no-arbitragequot; clearing price with nice properties, and discuss some algorithms to compute the price and optimal allocation efficiently. Clearing prices can be different when commodities are indivisible than when they are divisible. As an application, we provide an option pricing formula that takes into account the part of market friction that is due to indivisibilities.